In current international relations concepts such as weak states or failing-failed states are drawing increasingly more attention from the scholars and policy makers. These states appeared to be the main threats, not only as the sources of origin for terrorists, but also as their breeding grounds. In response, eliminating such weak states and replacing them with strong, organized, preferably centralized, free and democratic states became the primary concem of western democracies, especially of the U.S. These weak or failing states come into sight particularly in areas where state building has been relatively recent or elosely associated with a supra-national power. From this perspective, Georgia has been displaying the characteristics of a failing state in the early 1990s with its weak political structure, lack of a national financial system and rampant ethnic strife and illegal armed groups. To complicate the matters more, the control of state over its national territory was compromised and the involvement of foreign powers worsened the situation. This artiele aims at answering questions related with Georgia 's state formation or strengthening process with a specia! emphasis on the Turkish-Georgian relations.
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Fighting international terrorism and terrorist group s has become one of the most important topics in international relations, especially after 9/1 ı attacks and the London bombings. In this context, concepts such as weak states, failing-failed states, quasi states or ftssile states are drawing increasingly more attention from the scholars and policy makers. i These states appeared to be the main threats, not only as the sources of origin for terrorists, but also as their breeding grounds. In response, eliminating such weak states and replacing them with strong, organized, preferably centralized, free and democratic states became the primary concem of western democracies, especially of the U.S. This controversy over establishing newand strong nation-states, in fact, appears to be the irony of modem international politics, since part of the scholarly community has aıready moved on to discussing the role and even relevanee of nation-states in the age of globalisation.
What are the criteria used to defıne a state as a failing or weak one? How do we categorize a state as 'failed'? The answers to these questions are of the utmost importance because they not only deseribe a state, but also provide the roadmaps for those states that need to be intervened in and reconstructed. For the most part, states that cannot exercise their monopoly of power within borders, or have lost it to another element within the country are categorized as weak or failed states. Other common symptoms of weak states are: a complete failure of public services because of the erosion of the government's authority; a lack of common decision making processes due to the disintegration of civil society; the inability of state entities to exercise constitutional authority in various parts of the country; the lack of any capacity to establish permanent, healthy and stable relations with neighbouring states. By the same token, states like Iraq and ISee R. ı. Rotberg (ed.) Administration and Development, (24), 2004, pp. 75-86. Afghanistan whose national sovereignties are subject to signifıcant restrictions are also categorized as weak or failed states.
For the international community to establish a free and secure world in the 21 s1 Century, it is imperative to address the issue ofweak and failing states. The U.S. has vigorously claimed the leading role in this new struggle. President George W. Bush's statements could be evaluated from this perspective: "We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in the entire world."2 To make freedom permanent and secure at home, the new game plan requires expansion of democracy and the domination of democratic regimes abroad. The series of 'velvet revolutions', beginning with the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003 and continuing with Ukraine and Kirghizstan, were all welcomed by the Western world, as reflections of this new vision.
The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's remarks also need mentioning in this context:
We should all look to a future when every government respects the will of its citizens --because the ideal of democracy is universaL. For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East --and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people. 3 The main purpose of this democratic nation-building strategy is to establish strong states with pro-Western populations through fınancial, political and even military support.
These weak or failing states come into sight "particularly in areas where state building has been relatively recent or closely associated with a supra-national power."4 From this perspective, the Caucasus emerges as a troubled and unstable region largely because of its complex ethnic structure. The aspiration of each ethnic group for self-representation fundamentally questions the political structure and the legitimacy of newly emerging nation-states in the region. When we look at the first half of the 1990s, Georgia could be taken as the best example of failing/failed states in the Caucasus. 5 Georgia has been displaying the characteristics of a failing state in the early 1990s with its weak political structure, lack of a national financial system and rampant ethnic strife and iIIegal armed groups. To complicate the matters more, the controlaf state over its national territory was compromised and the İnvolvement of foreign powers worsened the sİtuation.
The general U.S. policy towards the Caucasus and the Central Asia, as well as the U.S. approach to Georgia was affected by the situation mentioned above. As far as the U.S. was concemed, the crucial question was how to make Georgia a strong, self-sufficient and unified state. The U.S. policy makers wanted to establish and secure a strong, liberal and democratic regime in Gcorgia, through supporting civil society and strong leadership in the country. These goals have proved to be partly successful. Mikhael Saakashvili, the former Manhattan attorney with a law degree from Columbia University, with his image of young democratic and strong leader, during and after the Rose Revolution, could be seen as a concrete result of this policy.6 However it should be remembered that this process of establishing new states has not been an easy process. More of ten than not, it takes a very long time and comes after a painful struggle. Another crucial question that needs to be asked about this long and painful process concerns the role of Turkey. As a regional power, NATO member and strategic partner of both the U.S. and Georgia, Turkey's role and position in this process calls for a thorough analysis. Has Turkey played a positive role in Georgia's transformation process? Did it largely follow the path of Western powers, or was it able to establish a foreign policy independent of the West. The answers to these questions e10sely relate to Turkey' s Caucasian policy as well as Turkey' s relations with the Western World and the U.S. Has Turkey developed a policy in-line with the U.S. or are there contradictions between Western foreign policy towards Georgia/Caucasus and its Turkish counterpart? This artiele aims at answering questions related with Georgia's state formation or strengthening process with a special emphasis on the TurkishGeorgian relations.
Georgia after the Collapse of the Soviet Union
Together with the BaItic Republics, Georgia played the pioneering role in the process of democratisation in the Soviet Union, which began with the policies of glasnost and perestroika and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the individual responsible from the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, Eduard Shevardnadze, together with Mikhail Gorbachev, was among the main organizers of this dramatic course of action. His reputation subsequently gained a privileged status for Shevardnadze and Georgia in the eye s of the Western world. Yet, it never brought about any tangible assistance for the solution of the problems that Shevardnadze and Georgia faced in the early 1990s. Russia implemented troubling and stiff policies towards Georgia without facing any opposition from the Western powers. When we look at Georgia today, almost 20% of its territory is outside the central government's control. The political status of the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains unresolved. About 300.000 people, the majority of whom are ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia's Gali region, have been displaced by the se contlicts and have yet to return to home. In addition to them, it is worth mentioning that several thousand Chechen refugees moved into Georgia, namely to the Pankisi Gorge in 1999. This caused serious problems for Georgia, and from time to time even brought Georgia to the point of a e1ash with Russia. Despite the existence of strong and sustained support from the U.S., and inereasing hopes raised by Saakashvili's new democratic government, all the problems mentioned above continue to exist in Georgia. Georgia's political condition has merely changed from being a failed state to being a weak one.
Following the declaration of independence in April ı99 ı, the state of affairs in Georgia was not very promising. During the early years of its independence, Georgia encountered very similar circumstances to that of the Soviet Union. Georgia's fragile ethnic structure could not effectively resist the ethno-terrİtorial conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This enduring cause of instability resulted in a loss of sovereignty over these regions by the central governmenL As a result, in Georgian proper at \east, de facto independent entities emerged. Moreover, these regions or de facto independent republics established c10se relations with Georgia' s main rival of all times, the Russian Federation. Russian authorities, on the other hand, perceived all these problems in the Caucasus in general, and in Georgia in particular, as great tools to maintain their presence and influence in Russia's 'near abroad'. Because of her policies of provoking minority groups against the newly established states and supporting separatist movements in the Caucasus, Russia emerged as one of the most important causes of instability in the region.
Additionally, in Georgia proper, apart from these separatist groups and an interventionist foreign power, there was a greater distress among other ethnic and religious groups. Javakheti region, mainly settled by Armenians, was among these potential pockets of distress. Similarly, Adjaria, with its overwhelmingly Muslim population under the control of Aslan Abashidze, was a problematic area that layoutside the authority of Tbilisi. Finally, along with the ethnic disputes, the intensity of political power struggles among the Georgians themselves drove the country closer to a civil war. The combination of ethnic and political power rivalries made the situation in Georgia more complicated and fragile. 7 7See C. Zürcher, "Georgia' Zviad Gamsakhurdia was the first elected president of the postSoviet Georgia after independence. Gamsakhurdia grasped power in Georgia, thanks to his personal charisma and his anti-Russian nationalist discourse. Despite having a strong public support, he could not manage to keep his country in good shape. Behind Gamsakhurdia's failures were his lack of experience and vision. In terms of domestic politics, he used populist nationalism extensively both before and af ter coming to power, thus, aggravated the fears of ethnic minorities. Despite his unquestioned legitimacy, his presideney was c1early becoming ill-defined. Although he continuously proclaimed his commitment to democratic principles, he became progressively more intolerant towards any opposition; he shut down newspapers, denounced intellectuals and other elites, and delayed economic reforms. He lacked the ability and intention to reconcile with different political players. Instead, he alienated the potential allies. As Alieva pointed out: "he failed because he could not transiate his popularity into successful state institutions, and once he alienated his supporters, there were no institutions on which to rely."8
On the other hand, Gamsakhurdia's foreign policy was basically characterized by a naive reliance on the West. He assumed that the democratic nature of his new forces would be suffıcient in attracting Western support. He also aimed to develop a defence doctrine that was oriented towards supporting the European security system. He objected efforts to make his country one of the members of the Euro-Atlantic Community. But, unfortunately he was unable to tie Westem interests with Georgia's by choosing the right strategic assets. Meanwhile, he opposed and ignored the role of Russia in Georgia's regional and global policies. As a result of this constricted foreign policy, Gamsakhurdia lost his political power. He was forced to quit the presideney and leave his country. He ended up as a political refugee in another problematic area of the Caucasus, Chechnya. Winter 1999 Winter -2000 to lead the country into the elections scheduled for the October of 1992. In a long and troubled period between 1992 and 1995, Shevardnadze struggled to strengthen his authority and stabilize the political structure in Georgia. During this uneasy process, the year 1995 was an important watershed. The new presidential elections and the constitutional referendum were both held in OClober 1995, after which Shevardnadze secured his political power. During this period, it is possibly true that Shevardnadze's internal and external political preferences were rational and triumphant. He was well aware of Georgia's 'insecurity of statehood and insecurity of neighbourhood'9.
In
Internally, compared to his predecessor, Shevardnadze had closer contacts with the militia and gained the support of their leaders. He was also in touch with some members of the intelligentsia and other elites who were alienated by Gamsakhurdia, the former communist nomenklatura, and a substantial part of the population which associated Shevardnadze with an earlier period of order and security.IO In fact when the Shevardnadze took the lead in Georgia, he inherited almost a failed or collapsed state. Beyond the existence of secessionist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, there was growing disobedience in Adjaria, a civil war with the previous government has begun and a Georgian state in which some parts were controlled by either Zviadists or local clans. Shevardnadze was well aware of this situation and thus tried to implement some policies by taking all these restrictions into account. For example, in order to estabHsh domestic order, Shevardnadze relied on the police more than the army. Once he secured order and achieved some peace with ethnic minorities, he got rid of most internal rivals and successfully attracted Western aid and investment. 1 i
In the foreign policy area, Shevardnadze's and thus Georgia's main problem has been how to manage its relations with Russia. It has to be particularly mentioned and kept in mind that, in Shevardnadze's early years in power, the war in Abkhazia was stiıı going on, and all the reasons that caused Gamsakhurdia' s abandonment of the country were stilI unchanged. Shevardnadze was well aware of all these conditions and Russia's tricks to hinder Georgian efforts to establish foreign policies independent of Russia as the main reasons behind the failure of state-formation in Georgia. Therefore, he was in a sen se forced to establish friendly diplomatic relations with Russia.
In that very same period, after partly resolving her immediate domestic problems, Russia began to implement the policy of 'near abroad' in order to re-establish its hegemonic power in former-Soviet republics, and to balance its global and regional rivals. This made Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular the direct object of the new Russian policy. Under these circumstances, despite the strong anti-Russian sentiments within Georgian society, Shevardnadze was compelled to establish closer relations with Russia. In fact, it was a wise choice for Shevardnadze to eliminate the threat of being a failed state in the region. The reasons behind Shevardnadze's preference of establishing closer relations with Russia could also be found in the policies of Western states, especially of the U.S. OriginaIly, Shevardnadze's preferred foreign policy orientation was a western one, as was Gamsakhurdia's. Almost all the Georgian leaders and elites, as well as Georgian people, saw cooperation with the West as the guarantee of their genuine independence. 1S However, the lack of interest or passivity from the Western world deprived Shavardnadze of any alternative. In 1993, Shevardnadze explained why his policies were seemingIy pro-Russian in the following way: "it was because America refused to assist in restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia". 16 All of Shevardnadze' s attempts to strengthen Georgia' s economic and security ties with the West by convincing his western partners about the strategic importance of surrounding Russia with democratic countries turned out to be unsuccessful. The 'benign disinterest' of the West made the Georgian president questions his initial calculation on the West's interests in his country, and in the 14Alieva, Reshaping Eurasia, p.18. lSG. Nodia, "A New Cycle of Instability in Georgia: New Troubles and Old Problems", in Bertsch, Crossroads and Conflict, Reshaping Eurasia, p.19. region. It forced him to look out for other assets to attract Europe and the United States to Georgia. 17 Thus, it would not be incorrect to say that the lack of international support forced Georgia to enter the eıs, rather than deepening its confrontation with Russia after the fall of Abkhazian capital, Sukhum.
Initially, as discussed above, the domestic environment in Georgia was not promising, and the support of the Western world towards Georgia was not sufficient to counterbalance Russia. The West was not engaged deeply enough to resolve the acute problems of state bui Iding in Georgia. Georgia's reliance on Shevardnadze's international image did not bring about the expected results either. The visits of foreign officials, both European and American, did not produce the vital economic aid. Their economic support could not meet, let alone exceed the existing humanitarian aid and NGO support in Georgia. Limited western aid naturally did not address the acute security problems in a country at the brink of collapse. Nor could it counterbalance the inereasing pressures coming from Russia. 18 In sum, during the early years of its independence, Georgia became a textbook case of a failed state. It had a fragile internal political structure with insufficient state apparatuses, including the ones for order and security (i.e. army and police). The state was unable to implement constitutional authority in various parts of the country which, in tum, made the nation vulnerable to the manipulations of foreign powers. Last but not the least, the weakness of the civil soceity compounded the problems of a corrupt and disorderly economic structure. As Jackson stressed in his article, due to the ideological, religious and political tensions within regions; the lack of management capacity amongst local level officers and councillors and; the fact that there has stili not been any restoration of Georgian state jurisdiction throughout the country, "no one knows the future political shape of Georgia."19 17lbid. 18lbid. 19Jackson, "Fissile State in Georgia", p. 81.
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However, the fact remains that, by virtually any strategic measure, Georgia should be at the heart of Caucasian affairs and operate as central pivot for Caucasian foreign policy, despite its lack of significant resources. The country has a great transportation network, with railway and road connections to Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey, and port facilities along the Black Sea. !ts central location in the Caucasus, access to the Black Sea and geographically attractive location as the main transportation hub for the region should make the country valuable to the West, especially to the u.S. 2D
Turkey in the Caucasus
In the strictly centralized adınİnistrative system of the Soviet era, it was unthinkable for Turkey or for the Caucasian republics to suggest anything such as bilateral relations. Traffic across the Turkish-Soviet border was extremely restricted. All the contacts went through Moscow, and there were almost no relations between Turkey and these republics at alL. Under these circumstances, Turkey' s approach to the developments in the Caucasus and the Central Asia during the Soviet dismantling process was a policy of 'wait and see'. lt would not be an exaggeration to say that, the predominant political elimate was one of uncertainty and fear. In this framework, the official Turkish foreign policy was defensiye and non-interventionist. But, despite this atmosphere of uncertainty and reluctance, subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey welcomed the leaders of new republics, especially the Turkic ones, in a quick succession in Iate ı99 i and gave promises of support and assistance.
Areflection of these promises could be seen in the fact that Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of these new republics. After the official recognition, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, initiating diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. Moreover, to facilitate the activities and to coordinate the flow of assistance to these republies, the Turkish International Cooperation Ageney (nCA) was established in January ı992 and Turkey 2Dlbid., p.75. organised and hosted the Turkic Summit in üctober 1992 in IstanbuL.21 Asimilar frame of rnind was also been prevailing among the politicians and statesmen of that period. As President Turgut Özal's September 1991 speech in the opening of the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) iIIustrates, most considered the breaking up of the Soviet Union as an 'historic opportunity' for the Turks to become a 'regional power'.22 For the fırst time in its modem republican history, Turkey had a chance to develop its own sphere of influence. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new Turkic-Muslim republics opened up a chain of possibilities for Turkey to play an important role in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Turkey had, for the fırst time, an opportunity to capitalize on her common historical, ethnic, religious and linguistic ties with these new nations. At the same time, this possibility contained an immense risk of alienating the historical fae of Turkey, Russia. Lastly, Turkish authorities were also faced with instability and ethnic problems emerging around their borders. There was a serious concem that these ethnically-fuelled problems could have spill over effects at home and aggravate the situation within Turkey. 23
The entanglement of opportunities with serious threats made it very difficult for the Turkish politicians and statesmen to reach a consensus over how Turkey should formuIate its foreign and security policy toward the former-Soviet region. The best solution to this problematic situation seemed to be formulating their policies toward Eurasia in caordination with the West, particularly with the U.S. 24 As it is well known, in the Cold War, Turkey was a part of the Western Alliance and its security environment. Ankara acted as a safeguard against the expansion of Soviet influence into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Thus, Turkish statesmen utilised this situation in the best possible way to maximize Turkish interests, and had the privilege of exercising influence and efficacy than she actually has. But this Cold War balance prevented Turkish authorities from developing any independent foreign and security policy, other than the Western World prescrihed. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that Turkey had no special vital national interest other than the Western World has. 2s With the end of the Cold War, it seemed that:
Ankara's policy horizoos [e.g. Caucasus and Central Asia, areas that were previously closed to Turkish policyand Turkey was cautious] have expanded and Turkey has became a more assertiye and independent actor on the international stage. Where once Turkey primarily looked West, taday Turkey is inereasingly being pulled East and South as welL. As a result, Turkey has been foreed to redefine its foreign and security policy interests and to rethink its international relationship.26
This, of course does not mean that Turkey was looking for a new seeurity and foreign policyagenda, independent of the West or the U.S. On the contrary, Turkish elites were trying hard to find ways to combine Turkey's assets and interests in this new environment with her existing relations and interests with the Western world. There was abasic rationality to this approach: Turkey lacked the infrastructure capabilities to assess the developments in those rcgions and design policies accordingly. The resources for establishing efficient and effectiye channels of communication with these republics and peoples were insuffıcienL And there was a general atmosphere of uncertainty within Russia in the early days of postCo Id War era. Additionally, the Western, especially the U.S. approach to Russia and the regional republics had a much stronger effect on Turkey's choice or policy planning. 27 In this early period of uncertainty, the Western vision toward the region was rather Russia-centric. Particularly the U.S. policy towards the Ca4..casus had a 'Russia-first' character. This approach, in the early years of independence of these new republics, caused the emergence of a fear among the Turkish policy makers. They were afraid that Turkeyand Russia would eventually have to challenge each other, because of their diametrically opposed interests in the region. Without the backing of the Western powers, Turkey could not afford to conduct an activist policy in the region. This would mean the end of everything from the very beginning. 28 In sum, at that period, Turkey developed and then followed the policy of regional cooperation by adapting these republics to the regional and global changes with the support and participation of Turkey. The most important aspect of this policy was assisting tbese new republics in the ir quest for identity. But, in order to do this, the Western, especially the U.S. backing was necessary. Specifically for the Caucasus, Turkey's even-handed and measured policy. despite some rhetorical f1ourishes, sought stable relations with Armeni~and Georgia, and tried not to directly antagonize Russia and Iran. Under this political atmosphere, Turkey's priority, generaııy speaking. were mostly the Turkish-Muslim republics. The U.S. had a striking role on this choice, possibly much more than Turkey's internal political environmenL The U.S. has come to see Turkey as a key strategic aııy and a more capable actor in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. and began to expect increasing involvements in these regions from Turkey side by side with the u,S.30 The reason behind Turkey's prompt response to such u'S. requests was simple. In those days, among the Turkish policy makers. there was a widespread belief that Turkey was losing its strategic importance in the eyes of Western policy makers, especiaııy the u'S. They worried that Turkey would lose the military and financial support from the WesL Therefore. finding a new role for Turkey within the overaıı Western strategy that would guarantee Turkey's continued importance became a central preoccupation in Ankara and in the pro-Turkish circles of the WesL 31 in this context, from the second half of the i990s. the prevailing mood of despair and uncertainty among the Turkish decision makers was replaced with optimism. The new approach emphasized the new opportunities and the expansion of cultural. economic and political influences in this vast region. As Hunter put it "it was during this period that the Turkish press and officials began to talk about the emergence of a new Turkic community stretching from the northern Caucasus to the Persian Gulf and from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China. They also declared that the 2 ist Century would be the Turkish Century."32 Inventor Behind this new euphoria, there was a feeling of selfconfidence among the Turkish decision makers resulting from Turkey's role in Gulf War. and the improvement in TurkishAmerican strategic relations. Turkish foreign policy makers started to believe that Turkey could no longer follow its traditional foreign At that point there was an overlap in the Turkish and U.S. policies, in which the Turkish foreign policy makers of the time had been most expecting. Behind this convergence and concordance, were the shared regional security problems and some other commercial priorities. 34
Against the backdrop of rising radical Islamic movements and terror that may cause instability and the emergence of failing states in former Soviet territories, the U.S.-based think tanks and the media supported the ideal of Turkish model at that period. 35 According to these organizations and some pro-Turkish activists, a geopolitical vacuum had emerged in those former-Soviet regions and there must be an acceptable actor to mı this vacuum. As a result of all these discussions, Turkey stood out as the model country, with its parliamentary democracy, relatively free market economy, and secular regime in a Muslim country. Subsequently, promoting Turkey as the model of economic and political development to those former Soviet republics and defining Turkey as the principal link between them and West became an important component of the U.S. and Westem policy. In this way, Turkey realized what was expected from her af ter the Cold War. By the help of this new Westem approach, Turkey had a chance to reshape its foreign and security policy. Turkey could focus on its national interests with a new direction that is concordant with the West, especially the U.S. and could sail 33Aydın, "Turkeyand Central Asia", p. the years of claustrophobia suddenly ended, and under the prevailing atmosphere of subsequent euphoria, Turkey's common cultu'tal, linguistic and religious bonds with the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian republics were frequently mentioned, both within and without Turkey, as abasis for influential position within the region, and Turkey as seen as an economic and political model for these new states.37
Appropriate to this new approach, Turkish policy makers began to advertise the plan that Turkey could serve as a secular model to the newly independent republics, thereby profiting from the undeniable cultural, linguistic, and religious affinities between the Turkish people and the peoples of these new nations. 38
In this new web of relations, at least at the beginning, Turkic and Muslim countries had priority. But in a very a short time, it was understood that Turkey's capabilities, both financially and politically, were insufficient to reach all these countries at the same time and thus Western support was essentiaı' At the same time, Turkish policy makers came to realize that Central Asia was not as 'close' as they thought it would be. There were serious variations in political, economic and cultural aspects between Turkeyand these new republics. Within this context, the Caucasus emerged as a 'closer and precedent' to Turkey, compared to the Central Asia. Likewise, the location of the Caucasus made it an essential springboard for Turkey to reach these distant regions of Central Asia.
In the Caucasus, because of the strong ethnic and linguistic links, Azerbaijan naturally gained a privileged position for Turkey. Ankara was closely involved in almost all sorts of developments 36Hunter,The related with Azerbaijan, ranging from domestic politics to foreign policy. in this context, Armenia was particularly confıned and excluded by Ankara because of a number of issues, such as the AzeriArmenian war on Karabagh, Armenian territorial demands on Northeastem Turkey, and the allegations of 'Armenian massacre'. In this early period, the other Caucasian republic, Georgia, was much lower on the priority list of Ankara, and therefore did not draw much attention.
The main reason that makes the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular a vital component of regional politics for Turkeyand for the West is the abundance of Caspian energy resources. With the emergence of oil and gas projects in the Caucasus, the region gained priority on the eye s of Western policy makers. Azerbaijan, because of its energy sources, and Georgia, because of its location to secure the transportation of Azerbaijani oil and gas to the international markets, took a vital place in western and Turkish foreign policy making. Thus, bringing stability and peace to the region becamc the main agenda for international policy makers. As areflection of this new understanding, the U,S. and then Turkey started to give a special importance to the situation in Georgia. This was the watershed in Georgia's modern history, which made the country an important component of global politics and forced all the powers, whether global or regional, to fınd ways to strengthen Georgian state. in this way , "US-Turkish cooperation has been particularly cIose in the Caucasus. Washington and Ankara have worked cIosely o strengthen ties to Georgia and Azerbaijan and encouraged both countries to adopt astronger pro-Western position. "39
Turkeyand Georgia
Because of its closed borders with Armenia, Gcorgia is the sole land access for Turkey to Russia, Caucasus and to the Central Asia. Georgia has 114 km land border with Turkey, and carries a great potential for the West to expand the transportation network in order to access the Caspian and Central Asia. Even though Georgia did not 39Larrabee/Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.115.
[VOL. XXXVI hold a crucial place in Turkish foreign policy initially, this did not mean that Oeorgia was entirely neglected by the Turkish foreign policy makers. It is possible to say that, in those early years, Oeorgian-Turkish relations have been positive on the surface. A number of economic and trade agreements were signed between the two countries, several official visits were made by dignitaries of both sides, and Oeorgia had joined the Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone and had a special place in Turkey' s Black Sea initiatives.
40
Nevertheless, in the very same period, despite Ankara' s official discourse of respect to territorial integrity and regional stability, it is possible to say that Ankara remained largely silent when Oeorgia had to struggle with ethnic problems, separatist movements and a civil war. Furthermore, there was no state interference in the associations of Turkish citizens of Caucasian origin. Thorough these associations, they were trying to promote a public opinion in favour of the Abkhazian cause. Because of this 'benign neglect' attitude of the Turkish state, one could argue that the Turkish-Oeorgian relations started on a rocky road initially. Over time, largely thanks to the energy transportation issues, relations with Oeorgia improved, gained a multidimensional character and have even expanded to the field of defence cooperation.
From that point on, Turkey played a special and critical role in the process of pulling Oeorgia out of the road to failed statehood, and helped to make the country a stronger and self-sufficient one. This new role for Turkey seems to be areflection of the general policy developed by the west and the U.S., rather than an independent Turkish initiative. But it needs to be mentioned that this new policy/role was fully concordant with Turkey' s interests and objectives. As shaped primarily by the American policy makers, the new role for Turkey binds both Turkeyand Oeorgia tightly together, and imposes a vital and challenging regional responsibility on Turkey. By playing its cards rationally and securing the Westem priority of bringing Caspian energy to international markets safely via alternative ways, Turkey has a chance to realize its regional objectives against the wills of its regional rivals, Russia and Iran. In the Caucasian aspect of this new great game, Georgia gained vital importance at the stage of transportation, especially after the decisions on the allocation and extraction of Caspian energy sources were taken. As a result, Georgian leaders finally managed to seize the western support that they were so enthusiastically looking forward to from the beginning of their independence.
The initial negligent aUitudes of Turkey ended in 1994, and newand promising western and Turkish policy preferences towards Caucasus and Georgia took hold afterwards. In 1994, the issue of transporting Caspian and Central Asian energy resources to the international markets via alternative routes became the main concem. From then on, Turkey emerged as a model for the Caucasian states, due to its long established connections with Europe and the U.S. and its economic infrastmcture, working state apparatus and strong state tradition. This made Turkey simultaneously an intermediary, supportive and 'transforming' neighbour for Georgia. Shortly after this, Turkey was promoted from being just an ally to being the strategic partner of Georgia. This new role for Turkey not only tightened the relations with the West and strengthened Turkey's position vis-a-vis her regional rivals, but also brought significant economic advantages. Needless to say, all these developments were welcomed with deep satisfaction by the Turkish policy makers.
The early signs of warming in Turkish-Georgian relations could be seen in accelerating social and cultural relations. For example nCA included Georgia in İts programs beginning with 1994 and a series of agreements to develop cultural and social relations between both countries were signed. 41 The most concrete reflections of the se warming relations, however, can be seen in Turkey's changing approach to Georgia' s ethnic problems. Turkey, whose policy initially was not so much concerned with Georgia's 'internal problems', started to get involved with these issues and wanted an activist policy to find a definitive solution to end all these conflicts. 41See TICA's offıcial web site http://www.tika.gov.tr.
[VOL. XXXVI During the early period of Georgian independence, Ankara's official policy emphasized the territorial integrity of Georgia, and suggested solutions to the on-going problems that could incorporate mutual understanding with respect for basic human rights. Between the lines of this reserved Turkish policy was the quick the analogy with the problems of its own Kurdish population. Turkey's official policy can probably be described in the answer of the then President Süleyman Demirel to a question about the Abkhazian problem: "We are saying that territorial integrity should be protected because if there is any objection to territorial integrity it would be impossible to protect peace in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in the Caucasus".42 Nevertheless, in the very same period that was marked by the upsurge of the Abkhaz issue 43 which seriously troubled the Turkish-Georgian relations, the Turkish government by no means restricted the activities of the groups/associations of Abkhaz or Caucasian origins within Turkey. As a result of the intense activism of the pro-Abkhaz Caucasian associations, Turkish public opinion gradually took the Abkhaz side in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. 44
In spite of the official Turkish foreign policyand increasing Georgian criticisms, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) did not hesitate to take the issue on its agenda through a parliamentary debate on the Caucasus and Abkhazia on 13 üctober 1992, largely due to the activities of Caucasian associations. 45 Against the criticisms of Georgian statesmen and officials, there was a growing public opinion in Turkeyand the issue was kept alive through 
,1992, pp.14-1S; (7),1992, pp.20-23; and (S), 1993, pp.13-16. ısı constant communications of these associations with the press, radio and TY channels. They organized group meetings with the Turkish MP's who were members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Commission, and these MP's were given detailed files on Abkhazia and the Abkhazian question, and reports and assessments were submitted to internationalorganizations like the UN and the OSCE.
Over time, Turkey began to take an active part to find a solution to the on-going disturbances next dooL As a concrete reflection of this policy change, Turkey became a member of the fivenation military observer mission, the United Nations Observers Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which was established to ensure compliance to the ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia since ı993. In addition to that, especially after ı994, Turkish offıcials became more proactive in bringing the parti es together for a final solution. Meanwhile, it can easily be observed that Turkey placed the Abkhazian issue on the back burner and concentrated on the Georgian leadership for its policy preferences. This new Turkish line, of course, was supported whole-heartily by the Georgian politicians and central governmenL At that period, Turkish authorities started to use a cautious discourse on the Abkhazian issue and took some measures in order to keep the activities of Caucasian associations under control, all as a response to Georgian expectations. it was under this atmosphere when in September ı996, Turkish foreign ministry informed the representatives of Abkhazia in Istanbul that residents of Georgia' s breakaway region will no longer be allowed into Turkey with the Soviet type passports issued by the Sukhum authorities. All Abkhaz wishing to enter Turkey must henceforth obtain valid Georgian passports from Tbilisi. This gesture from Turkey was probably one of the best examples of strengthening Georgian-Turkish relations. 46 Given these improvements in bilateral relations, Turkey undertook the host and peace broker role in an effort to settle the border problem between Abkhazia and Georgia. Both parti es met in Istanbul on 7-9 June ı999, under the auspices of Turkeyand also with 46"Abkhazian Access to Turkey Curbed", The Jamestown Monitor, Yo1.2 (ı 77), 24 September ı996. the participation of the OSCE and the UN, and tried to settle their points of disagreement. 47 At the end of the meeting, despite the fact that the parties failed to sign a binding document, they did manage to issue a declaration of mutual understanding. With the Istanbul Declaration, as it was named, the parti es declared that they would continue their efforts to achieve peace, and that the meeting did yield the possibility of finding solutions to shared problems in a step by step fashion. 48 Overall, from the perspective of regional power rivaıries, Istanbul meeting had an important result in that throughout the meeting, Turkey could once again have a chance to show of[ her significance and efficacy as a regional power to rest of the world. As the meeting c1early revealed, the sole trustworthy power in the region for both Abkhazia and Georgia was Turkey.
In the process of strengthening Georgian central state and İts territorial integrity, beyond all the aforementioned positive and proGeorgian steps, Turkey's role and importance could also be understood by focusing on two important aspects of Turkish involvement in Georgia: economic relations, and military cooperation and restructuring. Both of these aspects of Turkish involvement are c10sely related and intermingled. But it can be said that military side is both a result and requirement of economic aspect. This two levelled process has brought Turkeyand Georgia from the point of two neighbouring countries to strategic partners from 1994 to 1999.
Economic Relations and Structuring:
The growing Turkish-Georgian economic relations after the Cold War were anatural outcome of sharing a border. In a very short time, Turkeyand Georgia surpassed the structural and technical predicaments of Georgia's Soviet heritage and the crippled economic background and structure, as Turkey became one of the most important trade and economic partners of Georgia. 49 A major component of that partnership was the U.S.-backed plan for an eastwest energy corridor through Georgia, namely the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) Pipeline. In purely economic terms, the BTC pipeline would not have a large impact on Georgia. Georgia is going to receiye approximately $50 million a year from the tariff fees for its comparatively smail section of the route. so But politically, it is an invaluable asset which means that the West and the U.S. have turned their faces to the Caucasus and naturally to Georgia. This symbolizes and assures an independent Georgia. Even Shevardnadze regarded the construction of BTC as perhaps the most important achievement of his presideney, by saying in August 2003 that "Everyone recognizes that Georgia is a key link in this project. The functioning of the pipeline will largely depend on our country. Georgia has become part of a sphere of global interests, which is a serious factor in strengthening our state independence."Sl This project had in fact brought some positive spill-over effects, and was supported with parallel programs from the EU-sponsored TRACECA and INOGA TE to create a road, rai!, and ferry network linking Central Asia to Turkeyand Europe. s2 In sum, because of all these projects and Western involvement, Georgia gained a new kind of interest and importance in the eyes of Western policy makers and had a chance to find concrete support for its territorial integrity and independence. Turkey, as a neighbour and a regional power, alsa has an intermediary role in this new game.
The BTC pipeline is a product of long and tedious struggles. Beginning with the Clinton admİnistration, the Americans were interested in the Caspian energy sources and began to develop same policies towards that end. However, the development and transport of Caspian oil and gas has been largely driven by geopolitical calculations, rather than commercial ones. Paraııel to the US policy of isolating Iran in the Persian Gulf and in the Caspian, the U.S. policy makers planned the construction of multiple pipelines to export the Caspian oil in such a way that, it would alsa link the Caucasus and Central Asia to global markets while minimizing the role of Iran.
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Thus as a result of this new policy preference, Turkeyand Georgia gained an invaluable startegic role. The strength of Turkish resentment towards Armenia probably played a part in the latter's exelusion from this lucrative arrangement.
When the idea of BTC pipeline fırst came up in the middle of the 1990s, most of the major oil companies strongly opposed the project, elaiming that the pipeline is commerciaııy unviable. Against such strong apasition from the corporate actors, the support and commitment of the U.S. government made the BTC pipeline possible.54 Same argued that this project was a result of U.S. efforts to compensate Turkey for her support in the Persian Gulf War, and to make up for the lass of the revenues as a result of the war. 55 Whether or not its was due to this or same other startegic calculation, the pipeline in the end connected Georgia to Turkeyand both of them to the rest of the world.
This artiele is mostly interested in BTC's importance for Georgia's independence and Turkey's role on it, rather than its priority and economic advantages for Turkey. Thus, the economic and political effects of this project on Turkey will not be discussed in detail. 56 From a political perspective, we cannot ignore the fact that the choices made by Turkeyand Azerbaijan had vital importance on the construction of the BTe, and the way it which it became one of the key elements of Georgia's liberation. Both Turkeyand Azerbaijan considered Georgia as the only acceptable choice for the route of the pipeline. The questions of energy resources and their transportation to global markets drew these three countries closer together, and at the same time drew the attention of the U.S. and the western powers. The leaders of these three countries progressively began holding joint meetings and took steps that facilitated further cooperation among them. Examples of such cooperative incentives could be seen in the new border-crossing projects between Turkeyand Georgia, KarsTbilisi railway project,57 and the Deriner hydro-electric project on the Çoruh River, to the south of the Turkish-Georgian border. In all these projects, one can see the establishment of a network of multidimensional relations between these countries.
In January 2001, the U.S. also joined this network of economk relations by participating in the tri-party (Ankara-Tbilisi-Washington) 56For 
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[VOL. XXXVI preliminary agreement on economic cooperation and rehabilitation of Oeorgia. The U.S. engagement in this process was very important for both Turkeyand Oeorgia. Now, global actors were also involved in the region, which was congruent with the Turkish preferences. 58
It is possible to argue that the emergence of Turkey-Oeorgia-U.S. relations, which were largely centred on the energy issues, brought the attention of other global actors into the region. Within this context, the EU needs to be mentioned as a relevant actor. When project of BTC pipeline became mare of a reality in the early 2000s, the EU began to concentrate its efforts in this region, despite the lack of a common European energy policy, or a common security policy.59 Areflection of this novel EU interest in the region is the reason behind European Union's 1997 Black Sea Strategy, which was aimed at connecting the trans-European transportation network s with the Caucasian infrastructure. 6o This initiative made Oeorgia an important actor for the first time in the eyes of Europeans. Oeorgia's newly acquired position was reassured in the Commission's 2001 Oreen Paper. In short, EU was getting progressively more involved in the projects to export Azeri gas to Southeast Europe via Oeorgia, and in this process, Oeorgia getting the affiliations and connections that she wanted to have. From the Turkish foreign policyand national security perspective, all of the se were very positive developments.
Another striking aspect of these new relations is the BakuTbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) or the South Caucasian gas pipeline. This new pipeline should be considered as important as the BTC. The new pipeline will run parallel to the BTC through Azerbaijan and Oeorgia, before diverging from it within Turkey. it must also be remembered that each of these pipelines is by themselves larger than any infrastructure project ever to be built in the region. 6 \ These projects 58"Turkey's Search for Tri-nation Alignment in Caucasus Awaits Firm US Support", Turkish Daily News, IS Oct 2001. 59Helly/Goggia, "Georgian Security and the Role of the West", pp. 2S0-2S1. 6olbid. 61This new project, when compared with the BTC, will certainly bring greater immediate benefits to Georgia by providing a reliable supply of Caspian Sea gas to whole areas of the country that were previous/y carry the potential transform Georgia's geo-strategic position in the world both in economic and political aspects. They will connect Georgia closely with Turkeyand the with the west, which in tum, will engender extra interest in westem countrİes İn the stability of Georgia, through which oil and gas must be safely delivered into their markets.
The relations between Turkeyand Georgia that were shaped largely around the BTC petroleum pipeline and the BTE natural gas pipeline had a great role in improving the status of these neighbors into strategic partners. These bi-lateral relations have critical impact on the independence and national security of Georgia. Since the BTC petroleum pipeline is aıready completed in 2005 and the BTE gas pipeline will be done in 2006, establishing and protecting the peace and stability in the region serves the national interests of both Georgia and Turkey. Moreover, the two countries are trying to replicate this cooperation in carrying Azeri petroleum and gas to the world markets into other areas as welL. New areas of economic cooperation is also bearing fruits in the foreign trade performance of Georgia, which has been suffering for quite some time, after the implosion of the Soviet Union. 62 Nonetheless, probably the most important dimension in Turkish-Georgian relations, and in Turkey's efforts to rebuild and restructure Georgia lies in the military-security aspects of the issue. By establishing solid relations regarding security and military restructuring, the two countries have managed to protect the se large scale pipeline projects and ensure the long-term viability of economic relations. dependent on irregular Russian gas supplies or were left entirely without gas. See De Waal, "Georgia and its Distant Neighbors", pp. 319-320. 62As an example of fmits of trade relations Çelebi Holding's undertaking of the constmction of Tbilisi international airport couJd be giyen. With its $62 million cost it is an important constmction work and following the end of work the Holding will mn the management of the airport for LOyears. For a detailed analysis and evaluations see "Gürcistan-Türkiye ilişkileri, Örnek Alınacak Düzeyde", http://www.diplomatikgozlem.com/haber _oku.asp ?id=2082.
Military Relations and Restructuring
The most important aspect of Turkish involvement that challenges the balance of power in the Caucasus is its military cooperation with Georgia and extensive role it plays in the reconstruction of the Georgian military.63 In this process, the military cooperation between Turkeyand Georgia is part of a larger project to incorporate Georgia into the westem and Atlantic security network through NATO and the US. Turkey had a leading role, along with the US to accomplish this goal. Even though the exact figures are not available, the US and Turkey to date have donated at least $1 billion and $70 million respectively to fund Georgia's armed forces. M This financial aid and accompanying support has been utilized in restructuring the military apparatus, reforming the military schools and academies, and training of the personnel in line with the newly acquired technical infrastructure and equipment that complies with the NATO standards. Furthermore, it was used to improve the border security measures that can meet the NATO standards as welL. If we look back to all these developments, it is quite plausible to argue that they have managed to create a small but mobile and efficient military force in Georgia that is also compatible with the NATO standards. Turkey together with the U.S. has been taking a crucial and active role in the reformation of the new Georgian Army in accordance with NATO standards. The beginning date of this process was March 1997, when Turkeyand Georgia signed a defence cooperation agreement on military assistance and cooperation. 65 Following this agreement, Turkeyand Georgia signed certain subsequent complementary agreements in light of new developments. The most concrete result of this agreement was Georgian troops that have been serving under Turkish command in Kosovo since 1999. From then on, Turkey managed to balance the Russian int1uence over Georgia by providing training for Georgian officers and, thereby, strengthened the hand of Shcvardnadze in domestic politics. Turkey's actions had direct effects in Georgian domestic politics and in the regional balance as welL. Even during the earlyand rather premature stage of these programs, Shevardnadze stated that the relations between the two countries have been upgraded to the level of 'strategic partnership', in avisit to Turkey in February 2001. Thanks to his cooperation with Turkey, Shevardnadze could nowassert controlover the army and the domestic politics, and could turn his face towards the Wesı.
The most striking results of this new Turkish and NATO support for Georgia could be seen in Shevardnadze' s policy preferences. For example, at NATO's 50 lh Anniversary Summit in Washington, Georgia decided to quit the CIS Collectİve Security Treaty along with Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, in 1999. 66 In addition, he managed to replace Vardika Nadibaidze, a career Soviet army 65Turkish-Georgian military relations begins when Turkey became a member of the fıve-nation military observer mission, the United Nations Observers Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which was established to ensure compliance to the ceasefıre agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia since 1993. In addition Turkish officers are also taking part in OSCE Observation Mission which was established to observe Chechen-Georgian border and refugees in February 2000. 66Aıı of the three countries were the members of a new all1iance GUUAM, which was founded as GUAM in 1996 GUAM in -1997 officer who served as the Georgian Defence Minister until 1999, with Davit Tevzadze, a West Point graduate, which in turn meant increasing defence cooperation with Turkeyand the u'S. He managed to sign or forced Russians to sign an agreement on the border services in November 1998. Thus, Russia gradually transferred its controlover the Georgian-Turkish border to Georgia, by completing its withdrawal by rnid-1999. 67 With the early 2000, the relations between two countries rapidly accelerated. First of all, the then President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, came up with the idea of Caucasian Stability Pact that could potentially bring the Caucasian countries closer to Turkey and the West. Despite the problems it had in materialization, this proposal had some important impacts on the politics and the regional balances of the Caucasus. 68 70LarrabeelLesser, Turkish Foreign Policy, westem allies, vis-a-vis Iran and Russia. In this regard, this was the beginning of a whole new era that could not be reversed easily.
The most striking result of this cooperation agreement that draw attention was the Mameuli Military Air Base. Mameuli is based 40 km south-west of Tbilisi and is close to Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The ethnic composition of the population is mainly Azeri, and the town itself has a strategically vital role for Turkeyand Georgia. YoU7, 2004, pp. 43-77 . Related with the program the then Georgian Defence Minister David Tevzadze said in an interview posted on EurasiaNet.org. on 7 May that "From the outset we have openly deelared that we will participate in the anti-terrorist coalition, ... The help our American colleagues are providing will help us to solve Georgian internal problems and also to assist in international missions." And continued that the program "stand s to help Georgia manage its own problems without outside help or involvement." Additionally he noted that "Second, it should be elear that it develops our integration with the structures of NATO. We have long participated in [NATO's) Partnership for Peace [training) Program and Turkey took an active part in it. As a light of this approach, while the American special training units selected Georgian troops in Georgia, Turkish Partnership for Peace Training Centre (TU PTC) has been providing on-spot-training with its mobile training teams in the states of Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans, in line with the project of "Increasing the Efficacy of TU PTC in NATO" between 8 April and LO May.79 This way, Turkey was also sharing the responsibility with the US in the effort to shape and strengthen the structure of Georgia.
Another interesting development in this period is related to the Russian military bases in Georgia. Russia's policy of maintaining air bases in Georgia has always generated concem in Ankara. The status of these bases was discussed in the November 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, and Moscow agreed to close the Vaziani and Gudauta bases by 1 July, 2001. Additionally, Russia demanded a 14-year period to withdraw from the remaining two bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. However, this process has not started yet, due to numerous conditions program, as a resuh of which we have detachments trained to take part in the Kosovo peacekeeping force." After meeting with Tevzadze at the Pentagon on 7 May, Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said that about 15 countries, including Turkeyand Germany, have offered to assist Georgia and its minister of defence in various ways "in developing a better anti-terrorist capability for their armed forces." The United States and Georgia have a military-to-military relationship "that is really an expansion of the Partnership for PeaceINATO relationship," Rumsfeld said. "Ifs a multi-faceted relationship; it involves diplomatic and economic as well as security issues." See L. Turkey played a very important role in the period the lead up to the Rose Revolution of the Saakashvili govemment in terms of strengthening the central state and the govemment of Shevardnadze in Georgia. Thereby, Turkey contributed to the transformation of Georgia from being failed or weak state to being a strong and effectiye one. By increasing the economic relations with Georgia helping in the military restructuring of the country, Turkey played and indispensable role in strengthening the state structure in this neighbouring nation. It was this new state structure that also improved the political chances of the new political leader, Saaskashvili.
Despite the fact that Shevardnadze set the country on a proWestem course and strengthened the relations with Georgia's most important new ally, the U.S., he managed to simultaneously maintain a delicate balance with the powerful northem neighbour, Russia. He, however, failed to prevent the rampant corruption in the country, and could not effectively contribute to the process of democratization. Consequently, political support for Shevardnadze within Georgia began to erode after his re-election in 2000. Zurab Zhvania, the speaker of Parliament, and Saakashvili, his Justice Minister, broke with the President in 2001 and 2002, as did Zhvania's replacement speaker of the ParHament, another one time Shevardnadze protege, Nino Burjanadze, did in 2003. 82 These developments drastically changed the attitudes of the pro-democracy forees, especially the U.S. and the west, towards Shevardnadze.
In July 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush sent former secretary of state James Baker to meet with both opposition leaders and President Shevardnadze. To the President, Baker delivered a letter from Bush stemly stressing the need for free elections. Within the same days, The U.S. Ageney for International Development (USAID) spent $1.5 million to computerize Georgia's messy voter registration rolls. The U.S. and the European govemments also gaye OSCE funds to deploy an unprecedented number of foreign election 82Mitchell, "Georgia's Rose Revolution", p.343.
observers. 83 Despite all these pressures and efforts, eleetions held on 2 November 2003 were stained with fraud and eorruption.
The U.S. reaeted this by openly aeeusing the leadership of a former Soviet republic of rigging an eleetion. On 20 November, the U.S. State Department issued a press statement insisting that the results "do not accurately refleet the will of the Georgian people, but instead reflects massiye fraud. "84 A series of brief and non-violent mass protests on 22-23 November 2004, also referred as the Revolution of the Roses, foreed Eduard Shevardnadze to resign. This paved the way for a fresh round of yoting on 4 January 2004 in which the leader of the Revolution of Roses, Mikhael Saakashvili, was elected as the President for a fıve-year term. 85
After the elections, Saakashvili quickly launched an ambitious reform agenda that aimed at restoring good governance and ensuring Georgia's territorial integrity. As a part of this agenda, Turkey retaİns a vital role. One of Saakashvili's fırst diplomatic moves after his election in January was to dispatch an envoy to Ankara to reassure the Turkish decision makers of his eommitment to the BTC pipeline. Moreover, during the initial months of his power, the new President revealed his priorities in terms of Georgia's relations with Turkey, by visiting the country with a group of his ministers, officers and businessman, on 20 May 2004. This visit showed that the existing relations with Turkey were stili a crucial agenda for Saakashvili. During this visit, Saakashvili met with Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan as well as Turkish Joint Chief of Staff, and in discussed plans for the continuation of the aıready existing programs between the two eountries.
As Interior Minister Giorgi Baramidze said: "This visit is of great importance to Georgia. Turkey is not only our neighbour; it is 83Fairbanks,"Georgia's Rose revolution", p. 85Fairbanks,"Georgia's Rose Revolution". also our partner in a great number of field s which are very important to Georgia, from defence, security, and law enforcement to agriculture and energy .... We will naturally hold concrete discussions along these lines. Talks will also include Georgia's accession bid to NATO and the EU." He also added that, since the early periods of their independence, "Ankara provides equipment and training for Georgian armed forces. Turkey has also contributed to renovating military facilities on Georgian territory that have been vacated by Russian troops in recent years. Georgia and Turkey have traditionally conducted joint military exercises along their common border and, on 9 February 2004, they agreed to boost naval cooperation in the Black Sea waterways."86
In his visit to Ankara, Saakashvili personally requested Turkish language instructors from Prime Minister Erdoğan, by stating that "Turkish is the language of business and communication. The more Turkish citizens travel to Georgia (either for tourism or for business purposes), the more they would contribute to our development." 87
Starting from the 1990s, Turkish-Georgian relations reached to a level of strategic partnership, and are further enhanced with the most recent programs on border security.88 Beyond this collaboration, one can also expect deepening military cooperation that started around the BTC pipeline project and has continued with the construction of a railway line from Kars to Baku via Tbilisİ. All these joint projects help in establishing astronger regional balance of 
